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Abstract 
 
We exploit an age discontinuity in a Dutch disability insurance (DI) reform to identify the 
health impact of stricter eligibility criteria and reduced generosity. Women subject to the 
more stringent rule experience greater rates of hospitalization and mortality. A €1,000 
reduction in annual benefits leads to a rise of 4.2 percentage points in the probability of 
being hospitalized and a 2.6 percentage point higher probability of death more than 10 
years after the reform. There are no effects on the hospitalization of men subject to 
stricter rules but their mortality rate is reduced by 1.2 percentage points. The negative 
health effect on females is restricted to women with low pre-disability earnings. We 
hypothesize that the gender difference in the effect is due to the reform tightening 
eligibility particularly with respect to mental health conditions, which are more prevalent 
among female DI claimants. A simple back-of-the-envelope calculation shows that every 
dollar reduction in DI is almost completely offset by additional health care costs. This 
implies that policy makers considering a DI reform should carefully balance the welfare 
gains from reduced moral hazard against losses not only from less coverage of income 
risks but also from deteriorated health. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Many developed countries are experiencing an enormous increase in the number of 
disability insurance (DI) claimants. In the U.S., the share of individuals receiving DI 
benefits has more than doubled during the last three decades (Duggan and Imberman, 
2009; Wise, 2012) and the share of DI spending in total social security expenditures has 
risen from one in ten dollars in 1988 to nearly one in five dollars in 2009 (Autor, 2011). 
Since 2009, the ratio of disability beneficiaries to workers in the U.S. has overtaken that 
of the Netherlands, which was long regarded the ‘world leader’ in DI dependency 
(Burkhauser and Daly, 2011). Much of the increase in DI roles tends to be attributed to 
moral hazard and governments have responded by tightening eligibility criteria and/or 
reducing the generosity of benefits (e.g. Autor and Duggan, 2006; Karlström et al., 2008; 
Staubli, 2011). Such rationalization in the Netherlands has contributed to the country 
being knocked off the top of the DI dependency league table.  
 
The standard welfare evaluation of DI weighs the gains from insuring income risk against 
the losses from moral hazard incentives to reduce work effort. Welfare improving 
reforms encourage the work-able to re-enter employment. Since work capacity is not 
perfectly observable, indeed this is the reason for the moral hazard problem, there is a 
risk that mistakes are made in any rationalization program or the process goes too far, 
such that partially incapacitated individuals for whom work takes an inordinate toll on 
health are forced back into employment. The health impact may operate, for example, 
through stress related to re-entry into the labor market, or from work tasks that are 
physically demanding given certain health conditions. As an example, we refer to the 
appalling case of Sheila Holt. In February 2014, the UK government issued an apology to 
the family of Sheila Holt, a woman who had been sent an official letter encouraging her 
to find work despite having been in a coma for two months (BBC News, 2014). Ms. Holt, 
who has suffered from severe bipolar disorder from childhood and had not worked for 27 
years, had been threatened with a cut in her benefits unless she attended a job-seeking 
course that is part of a government drive to get individuals on disability insurance back 
into employment. Apparently, the stress she experienced as a result of participating in the 
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work program provoked a manic episode, which resulted in Sheila’s hospitalization. 
While in hospital, she suffered a heart attack and entered a coma. 
 
This paper examines whether there are many other cases like that of Sheila Holt, perhaps 
not as extreme but similar in the sense of health deteriorating as a result of more stringent 
disability insurance (DI). Evidence for any negative health effects of DI reform implies 
that, besides the direct loss in welfare resulting from deteriorated health, health 
deterioration may entail health care costs that offset the savings from cuts in DI and will 
make the reform less beneficial from the perspective of public finances. On the other 
hand, health may also improve if post-reform re-employment improves the cognitive 
ability of individuals as is often found in the retirement literature (Rohwedder and Willis, 
2010; Mazzonna and Peracchi, 2012; Bonsang et al., 2012).  
 
We provide the first evidence we are aware of on the health impact of DI reform by 
examining the consequences of a Dutch reform in 1993 that entailed medical re-
examination of DI recipients, stricter eligibility criteria and benefit cuts. Identification 
comes from an age discontinuity – the eligibility criteria were made significantly more 
stringent for disability recipients aged below 45 on August 1
st
, 1993. Following medical 
re-examination, many DI beneficiaries had their benefits cut and the average reduction 
was about 10 percent higher for the younger cohort subject to the more stringent criteria.
1
  
We exploit the discontinuity in the reform by comparing outcomes in later years of 
individuals younger than the 45 year-old cutoff at the time of the reform to the outcomes 
of individuals older than this threshold. The reform was introduced with little warning 
and so differences in DI generosity arising from it could not have been anticipated. To 
estimate the effect on health, mortality and medical spending we use administrative panel 
data providing information on hospitalization and vital status for the total population of 
Dutch DI claimants.   
 
We find that the reform had a negative impact on the health of female DI claimants. 
Women subject to the stricter DI eligibility criteria had a 2.2 percentage point higher 
                                                 
1
 See also Borghans et al. (2014) for further information. 
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probability of being hospitalized over twelve years and a 1.4 percentage point higher 
probability of dying within seventeen years of the reform. There is no significant effect 
on the hospitalization of males, but their probability of death within seventeen years is 
estimated to have been reduced by a statistically significant 1.2 percentage points. We 
hypothesize that the gender difference in the effect is due to the reform tightening 
eligibility particularly with respect to mental health conditions, which are more prevalent 
among female DI claimants. 
 
For women, a €1,000 reduction in the annual amount of DI benefits led to a 4.2 
percentage point higher probability of being hospitalized over twelve years and a 2.6 
percentage point increase in the risk of death within seventeen years. A simple back-of-
the-envelope calculation suggests that each €1 reduction in spending on DI benefits was 
offset by an increase of €0.23 in spending on hospital care, excluding the cost of 
ambulatory care and prescribed medicines. In addition, using an estimate of the value of a 
statistical life, the effect on life expectancy arising from each €1 reduction in DI benefits 
is valued by €0.69. Combining the medical care costs with the value of the lost lives 
gives a loss almost equal in value to the public finance savings arising from the 
rationalization of DI for females. While the efficiency gains from the curtailment of any 
moral hazard effects on work incentives would need to be factored into a full welfare 
analysis, it would appear that health effects of tighter DI rules can be empirically 
important and, in addition to the impact on moral hazard, income insurance and public 
finances, need to be taken into account in any evaluation of the case for DI reform.  
 
While the magnitudes of our estimated effects are obviously specific to the particular 
Dutch reform, the broad conclusions are relevant in a wider context. Health deterioration 
arising from measures that push (female) DI recipients back to work suggests that the 
extent of moral hazard may have been overstated. An employment response to DI 
eligibility rules and generosity is not sufficient to conclude that moral hazard exists. The 
difficulty in defining and containing moral hazard with respect to DI lies in the fact that 
disability is not a clear-cut medical condition. Rather it is a threshold on a continuum of 
work incapacity, and the pain and discomfort associated with work, that is defined by the 
policymaker (Diamond and Sheshinski, 1995). Reforms that tighten the eligibility criteria 
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and so raise the threshold of work incapacity may induce individuals who can only work 
under excessive duress to take up employment causing health to deteriorate. This 
argument does not deny the existence of substantial moral hazard in DI, nor does it claim 
that reforms are unnecessary to reduce moral hazard.
2
 Rather, the point is that setting the 
threshold of work incapacity involves balancing losses from the Type I errors that 
represent moral hazard with the losses from Type II errors that arise when individuals 
who can only work at an excessive cost to their health are denied DI. Given the 
generosity of the Dutch DI program in the nineties, one would expect the marginal 
individual affected by the 1993 reform to have been in better health than the marginal DI 
recipient in a less generous scheme. This suggests that the negative health effects of 
tightening DI in other countries and periods may be even greater than we estimate. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the reform 
used for identification. Section 3 describes the data, Section 4 describes the empirical 
strategy, and Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. Disability Insurance in the Netherlands 
 
2.1 Pre-reform 
 
In the Netherlands, all employees were and are still insured against an earnings loss 
resulting from an illness or infirmity. In the first year after the onset of a disability 
individuals are entitled to sickness payments. After this first year, they become eligible to 
                                                 
2
 There is a substantial literature on moral hazard in DI. Bound (1989) and Chen and van der Klaauw 
(2008) found that labor supply of U.S. males over the age of 45 who applied for DI would have been 30 to 
40 percent higher if it were not for the availability of DI benefits. Further suggestive evidence for moral 
hazard is found in the fact that DI applications tend to rise and fall with the unemployment rate (e.g. Bound 
and Burkhauser, 1999; Autor and Duggan, 2003, 2006). There is also evidence that policies that tighten DI  
are effective in reducing the number of claimants and bringing people back to work (Autor and Duggan, 
2003; Borghans et al., 2014). 
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receive DI benefits.
3
 Note that there is allowance for partial disability and health 
insurance is not tied to the receipt of DI benefits.  
 
The amount of DI benefit depends on the "degree of disability", which equals the 
percentage difference between earnings before disability and the  potential earnings of the 
applicant, which prior to the 1993 reform was determined in three steps. First, the 
applicant was examined by a medical doctor, who compiled a list of job demands that the 
applicant could still meet.
4
 Second, this list was compared with a dictionary of 
occupations that specified the job demands, as well as the required education level, for 
each occupation in order to identify a set of occupations the applicant would be able to 
perform. Only occupations that were no more than two education levels (on a scale of 
seven) below the level demanded in the applicant’s previous occupation were considered. 
Finally, the applicant’s potential earnings capacity was defined as the mean wage of the 5 
highest paying occupations in the set of feasible ones, with the further proviso that at 
least 10 workers should be currently engaged in each of the occupations in the applicant’s 
region (though there should not necessarily be that number of vacancies).
5
 When 5 
suitable occupations with at least 10 workers could not be identified, the potential 
earnings capacity was set at 0. The degree of disability was then defined by the 
percentage loss in earnings due to disability, i.e. the difference between prior labor 
earnings
6
 and the potential earnings capacity divided by prior labor earnings, and grouped 
into 8 categories varying from 0-15% to 80-100%. The replacement rate was then 
determined by these categories (see Table 1).   
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 Further institutional background information on the Dutch disability act and recent trends and patterns in 
Disability Insurance enrollment in the Netherlands can be found in Bovenberg (2000) and García-Gómez et 
al. (2011), respectively. 
4
 The complete list includes 27 physical job demands (such as “lifting,” “kneeling,” and “ability to deal 
with temperature fluctuations”) and 10 psychological skills (such as “ability to work under time pressure,” 
“ability to perform monotonous work,” and “ability to deal with conflict”). 
5
 For this procedure, the Netherlands was divided in 5 regions and in 16 “start regions.” Alternative jobs in 
the “start regions” had to be considered first. Only if less than 5 suitable occupations were available, 
alternative jobs in the neighboring regions (within one of the main 5 regions) could be considered. 
6
 Prior labor earnings were subject to a cap, which was about €36,000/year in 1999. 
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2.2 The reform 
 
The 1993 reform was designed to lower the generosity of disability benefits and to reduce 
the number of (full) disability claimants.
7
 With this aim, the criteria to define the earnings 
capacity were changed in two respects.
8
 First, eligibility was only based on objective 
medical information, not the doctor’s judgment. This required that a functional work 
limitation was clearly observable, and could be linked directly to a medical diagnosis. As 
a result, disabilities related to mental health problems became more difficult to prove.  
Second, the criteria for identifying suitable occupations were relaxed, such that: (i) all 
education levels could be considered, (ii) only 3 occupations (rather than 5) with at least 
10 workers employed were required to calculate the mean potential earnings, and (iii) the 
geographic region within which there should be employment in the occupations was 
expanded roughly threefold.
9
 These changes increased the probability of finding a higher-
paid occupation that the applicant could still perform, and thereby raised the potential 
earnings capacity. Furthermore, it became less likely that the potential earnings capacity 
was set at 0 because insufficient occupations could be identified. For any individual who 
was enrolled in DI, the potential earnings capacity under the new criteria was always 
higher than under the old criteria and, hence, DI benefits were lower. 
 
The new criteria for determining the potential earnings capacity applied both to new  
applicants and to existing claimants aged younger than 50 at the time of the reform  
(August 1
st
, 1993). Existing claimants were to be re-examined, which was scheduled to 
take place by age cohort from 1994 onwards: those aged <35 on the 1
st
 of August 1993 in 
1994, 35-40 in 1995, 41-44 in 1996/1997, and 45-49 in 1997-2001. However, shortly 
before the re-examinations of the oldest cohort started, political pressure led to a 
parliamentary motion passed in November 1996 ruling that this cohort would be assessed 
on the pre-reform, more lax criteria. This created a discontinuity in DI stringency 
                                                 
7
 The formal name of the 1993 DI reform is “Terugdringing Beroep op Arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzeker-
ingen (TBA),” which roughly translates as “Reducing claims on disability insurance”. 
8
 Another important change of the 1993 DI reform was the introduction of an age- and duration-dependent 
benefit for new DI applicants.  However, these changes did not apply to those already receiving disability 
benefits as of August 1993, i.e. the group that we study here. 
9
 Now, rather than occupations in only one of the 16 “start regions", all available jobs within the main 
region where the individual was residing (out of 5 main regions) could be considered. 
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between the cohort under the age of 45 and those aged 45-49 that we exploit to estimate 
the effects of reduced generosity on health outcomes.
10
 
 
 
3. Data 
 
3.1 Data sources 
 
We extract our data from several large administrative databases maintained by Statistics 
Netherlands. Individuals can be matched across the various data files by a Random 
Identification Number (RIN), which is an encrypted Dutch equivalent of the U.S. Social 
Security number.
11
  
 
We use administrative data on all disability benefits recipients aged 15-64 in the 
Netherlands for the period 1995-2005. These data originate from the organizations that 
administered the disability benefits at the time. They include information on entry and 
exit dates of a disability spell, the degree of disability (in categories), labor earnings prior 
to DI entry and disability benefit payments. Unfortunately, there is no reliable or 
consistent information about the medical condition that led to enrollment. 
 
Demographic characteristics of the claimants are obtained from the municipal registries. 
These contain information on date of birth (year and month), marital status, number of 
children, nationality, and place of residence for all residents of the Netherlands.   
 
Information on other sources of income are obtained by merging five different 
administrative datasets: earnings from paid employment of all employees, self-
employment earnings, unemployment benefits, general assistance, and receipt of other 
types of social assistance (from about 30 relatively minor programs).  Information about 
income from paid employment and self-employment comes from the tax authorities and 
                                                 
10
 We cannot exploit the discontinuity at age 50 since the re-examinations of those ages 48 and 49 were 
gradually phased out because of the long backlogs that arose at the disability office.  
11
 These data can be accessed via a remote-access computer after a confidentiality statement has been 
signed. 
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social insurance records, whereas the data on social assistance are provided by the 
organizations that administer these programs. All these files are available from 1999 
onwards.   
 
Last, we obtain information on health outcomes from registries of mortality and 
hospitalizations covering the entire Dutch population. Mortality records are available for 
the period 1996-2010 from the reports filed by a medical examiner or pathologist. 
Furthermore, we have information available about all hospitalizations for the period 
1996-2005 with medical and administrative details for all patients who have had inpatient 
hospital treatment in the Netherlands.
12
 We distinguish between hospitalizations for 
various types of diseases based on ICD-9 classification.
13
 We estimate the effect on the 
probability of a hospitalization since 1996, and every year until 2005, as well as on the 
cumulative number of hospitalizations from 1996 up till a given year.  
 
3.2 Sample definition 
 
Our baseline sample consists of all individuals who (i) received DI benefits on August 1
st
, 
1993, (ii) were aged between 40 and 50 on that date, and (iii) were still on DI as of 
January 1
st
, 1996. The first restriction follows from the fact that the discontinuity in DI 
generosity only applies to disability claimants enrolled at the time the reform went into 
effect. The second restriction is made to create a sample of individuals who are relatively 
comparable in all other respects except for the assessment of earnings capacity made on 
re-examination and the consequent difference in DI generosity. The standard criterion by 
Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) for setting the window of a regression discontinuity 
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 From 2006 onwards, the hospital registry continued but participation became voluntary for hospitals. 
Therefore, from 2006 onwards the number of observations drops substantially and the sample is no longer 
representative for the Dutch population. 
13
 International statistical classification of diseases and related health problems. Admissions for the 
following diseases and conditions are distinguished: circulatory system, musculoskeletal system and 
connective tissue, neoplasm, nervous system, sense organs, respiratory system, digestive system, 
genitourinary system, symptoms and ill-defined conditions, injury and poisoning, blood and blood-forming 
organs, dermatological and subcutaneous tissue, congenital anomalies, nutritional disorders and mental 
disorders. Note that mental illnesses are not very well covered in the hospital data, as people with mental 
illness are not very likely to be hospitalized. 
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(RD)
14
 would suggest taking an estimation sample only including claimants aged 
between 43 and 47. However, with this age window there is insufficient power: at most 
0.30 for males and 0.25 for females. Therefore we have extended the age window to 
claimants aged 40 to 50. Point estimates with the smaller sample are not different from 
the ones for the wider sample (see section 5.3 for more details). The last restriction is 
imposed by the fact that data on DI status are available only from 1996.  From those 
observed on DI in January 1996, we select those whose records show they had been 
claiming at least since 1
st
 January 1993. Given that the re-examinations of the individuals 
in our sample did not start before 1996 and the parliamentary motion excluding the 
cohort aged 45 and above from the more stringent criteria was only passed in November 
1996, we do not expect any differential attrition to have taken place around the age of 45 
prior to January 1st, 1996.
15
 This assumption is supported by Appendix Figure B1 where 
we show that there is no differential exit out of DI for individuals aged below and above 
45 in 1995.   
 
We drop all non-native Dutch from our sample because of problems with certain groups 
of immigrants that potentially invalidate the identification strategy. First, more than a 
proportional share of Turkish immigrants is registered as being born in January, which 
would appear to reflect inaccurate birth registration and is problematic for our 
identification based in date of birth.
16
 Second, there are large differences in the share of 
immigrants from the East Indies across cohorts either side of the threshold determining 
exposure to the more stringent test.
17
 We cannot rule out that there are similar problems 
with other groups of immigrants. We decide to take a conservative approach and drop all 
non-native individuals from our sample given that there are differences in health and life-
expectancy between individuals from different ethnic backgrounds. However, we will 
                                                 
14
 More information about our empirical strategy follows in section 4. 
15
 Please note that throughout this paper we refer to cohorts by their age at the time the reform went into 
effect (i.e., as of August 1
st
, 1993). 
16
  It was common for families in rural areas of Turkey not to register new-born children immediately after 
they were born, but rather wait until more children were born and then register them all at once. Frequently, 
parents did not remember then the exact birth date of their children, and registered them as being born on 
January 1
st
. 
17
 Directly after the Second World War (WWII) a large inflow of immigrants from the East Indies who 
fought in the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army came to the Netherlands and had children shortly after 
arrival. These people are aged 47 at the time of the reform, which creates important differences in the 
composition of the group aged 40-44 compared to the group aged 45-49. 
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show in section 5.3 that the results are not changed when non-native Dutch are included 
in the sample. After these sample restrictions, our baseline sample in 1996 contains 
91,090 males and 46,669 females in 1996.
18 
 
 
3.3 Summary statistics 
 
Table 2 presents a summary of our variables of interest. Panel A shows the characteristics 
of the individuals in our sample as of 1
st
 January 1996 before they were re-examined. On 
average, the claimants in our sample have spent 7-8 years on disability insurance at the 
time the reform was implemented. The majority of the sample is fully disabled (between 
80 and 100% earnings reduction). This holds in particular for women.       
 
Panel B presents the means of our key outcome variables. In the interest of space, we 
only present the health indicators for the last year of our observation period. By the year 
2005, which is the last year for which we have information on hospitalizations, more than 
half of the claimants had been in hospital at least once. On average, individuals in our 
sample have been in hospital about twice by 2005. For women the number of 
hospitalizations was slightly higher than for men. On the other hand, the mortality rate 
was higher for men. By 2010, 15 percent of the male, but only 11 percent of the female, 
DI claimants had died. 
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 About 3 percent of the individuals in our sample appear in more than one disability record in a given 
month. These observations are dropped because it is not clear whether they are administrative/coding errors 
or whether they arise from individuals who are entitled to multiple DI benefits because they were employed 
in multiple jobs before the onset of disability. Since there is no discontinuity at age 45 in the probability of 
someone having multiple disability records, we believe that omitting/including those with multiple records 
would not substantively change our results. Furthermore, in order to take into account that hospitalizations 
are only observed for people that are still alive, we censor all observations for people deceased in the 
hospitalization measures. Hence, the number of observations for hospitalizations for 1997 - 2005 is slightly 
lower than in 1996. Note that our results do not change if we would not censor observations for deceased 
individuals. 
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4.  Empirical Strategy 
 
The 1993 DI reform in the Netherlands has had a significant impact on the average 
benefits that a DI claimant received. On average, disability benefits were reduced by 
€1,302 and €535 for men and women under the age of 45, respectively (see also Table 3, 
first stage). Borghans et al. (2014) evaluate the employment and income effects of the 
same DI reform and also find – using a similar identification strategy - that the more 
stringent re-examinations have reduced the generosity of the DI program for individuals 
under the age of 45. For this younger cohort the reform caused the annual DI benefits to 
drop by about 10 percent more than for individuals aged 45 and older. Furthermore, the 
replacement rate was 5.9 percentage points lower and exit out of disability was 3.8 
percentage points higher for the affected cohort at the discontinuity.
19
 We exploit these 
effects to examine whether the reform had any impact on health.  
 
We estimate separate models for the various health outcomes. Treatment is indicated by a 
dummy equal to 1 for those subject to the stricter re-examinations (i.e. those aged under 
45). Our set of controls include age in months as of the 1
st
 of August 1993, an interaction 
between the treatment indicator and age measured in months younger/older than turning 
45 in August 1993 to allow the age trend to differ either side of the discontinuity that 
defines treatment, 6 dummies for the degree of disability in 1
st
 January 1996, pre-DI 
earnings, a dummy for being married in 1996, 39 regional dummies, and duration on DI 
at the start of the reform. To control for seasonal patterns in mortality by month of birth 
(Doblhammer and Vaupel, 2001), we also control for 12 month of birth dummies. 
Finally, we include a dummy for those born between May 1945 and January 1946, and a 
dummy for those born between February 1946 and January 1947 to allow for potential 
differences in the composition of the baby boom generation and for the possibility that 
those born shortly after World War II differ in health status from other cohorts because of 
conception during the last months of the war that were particularly harsh in the 
Netherlands (Scholte et al., 2012). 
 
                                                 
19
 Further information on these first stage effects can be found in Borghans et al. (2014). 
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The key identifying assumption is that the stringency of the criteria applied in the DI re-
examinations is the only discontinuous change relevant to the health outcomes at the 
cutoff age of 45.  Although the data do not allow us to test this, we are not aware of any 
other policy change that would create a discontinuity around this age.  We have regressed 
all covariates used in the analysis on the treatment indicator in a reduced-form RD 
specification to check for any discontinuities around age 45. Under the null hypothesis 
that there is no effect, from 51 placebo regressions we would expect to find a significant 
coefficient for only 3 (at 5%) or 5 (at 10%) of the covariates. We find a significant effect 
for only 3 of them.
20
   
 
 
5.  Results 
 
5.1 Impact on mortality 
 
Figure 1 shows the probability of death by 2010 for the individuals in our data. There is 
an upward jump in the male mortality rate at the age of 45, which corresponds to the age 
from which the more generous DI reassessment applied, but a downward jump in female 
mortality. Men aged below 45 that were subject to the stricter regime had a 1.2 
percentage point lower probability of having died by 2010 than older men, controlling for 
age. Younger women that experienced the tighter reassessment had a 1.4 percentage point 
higher probability of death. This corresponds to a relative effect of about 13 percent. 
Estimating mortality in earlier years (Figure 2) we find a consistently positive effect on 
mortality for women, and a consistently negative effect for men, where the magnitude of 
both increases over time and reaches significance in the last two years (see also Appendix 
Table B2 for the results). Interpreting these estimates as causal effects would suggest that 
tightening the eligibility criteria and reducing benefits raised the mortality rate of women, 
but reduced that of men. In Section 5.3. we show that these results are robust to various 
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 The full results are available in Table B1 in the Appendix 
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robustness checks,
21
 and consider possible explanations for this gender difference in 
section 5.4.  
 
As a result of the re-examination, some individuals lost all their DI benefits because they 
were considered ineligible under the new criteria, whereas others experienced a marginal 
reduction in their benefits. In order to give an impression of the average effect on 
mortality for those who were affected by the reform, we use an IV standard fuzzy RD 
specification to scale our reduced-form estimates by the amount of the reduction in 
disability benefits. The IV estimates of Table 3 show that a €1,000 reduction in DI 
benefits led to an increase in the cumulative mortality rate by 2010 among women of 2.6 
percentage points, which is a relative increase of 23 percent.
22
 For men we find that a 
€1,000 reduction in DI benefits has led to a 0.9 percentage point (i.e. 6 percent) reduction 
in mortality by 2010. Note that the average reduction in DI benefits due to this reform 
was €1,302 for men and €535 for women.  
 
The consistent effects of this DI reform on mortality for men and women imply an 
important welfare cost to society. In order to give an impression of the magnitude of this 
cost, we try to monetize this health impact using the value of a statistical life in the 
Netherlands, which is valued at €2.2 million in 2001 prices (Blaeij, 2003). Using a simple 
back-of-the-envelope calculation, the mortality effects from Table 3 suggest that a €1,000 
reduction in disability benefits implies an additional total welfare loss of about €1,023 
million in 2010 prices.
23
 Total budgetary savings would be €1,486 million in 2010 prices. 
This suggests that every euro reduction on DI benefits due to the reform led to an 
additional welfare loss of about €0.69. Note that this is a very simple calculation not 
taking into account indirect budgetary effects, such as savings on future old-age pension 
                                                 
21
 One may argue that our analyses involve running many regressions which increases the probability of a 
Type 1 error. However, our significant effects do not appear randomly: we find quite persistent significant 
effects for certain types of hospitalizations over time, whereas others are never significant. This suggests 
that what we find are true health effects rather than Type 1 errors. 
22
 Unfortunately, we have insufficient observations for each cause of death to investigate whether there are 
particular causes of death driving this result. 
23
 This includes both the effect on men and women. More information about this calculation can be found 
in the Appendix section A1. 
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benefits and future health care expenditures for those deceased.
24
 Therefore, the numbers 
should be interpreted with caution. Nevertheless, this simple calculation shows that that 
the reform – which aimed to reduce government spending on disability – was less 
successful from a welfare point of view due to the substantial effects on later mortality. In 
the next section, we investigate whether there were any further health effects, which can 
account for the mortality effects.  
 
5.2 Impact on hospitalizations 
 
Figure 3 shows the effect of the reform on the probability of being hospitalized between 
1996 and 2005. In moving from older to younger cohorts, there is an upward jump in the 
hospitalization probability for women below the age of 45 who were subject to the more 
stringent re-examinations. There is no clear discontinuity for males. A graph of the 
cumulative number of hospitalizations until 2005 shows a similar pattern.
25
 The reduced-
form estimates are presented in Figure 4. By 2005, “treated’ women (i.e. subject to the 
stricter re-examinations) on average faced a 2.2 percentage points higher probability of 
being hospitalized and 0.25 additional hospitalizations compared to older “control” 
women (i.e. subject to the weaker re-examination regime).
26
 Furthermore, the effects on 
hospitalizations are not only apparent in the long run but already from 1996. In addition, 
while the effect on admission probability in the short-run is almost as large as in the long-
run, there is an upward trend in the effect on the number of hospitalizations. This 
suggests that health worsens shortly after the decrease in DI benefits, and that it does not 
recover over time, but deteriorates even further. This is not inconsistent with our finding 
of mortality effects only in the long-run.  
                                                 
24
 Also, one may argue that the value of a statistical life of an average individual in The Netherlands 
exceeds that of a disabled individual, since the life expectancy of this unhealthy population is on average 
lower and the value of a statistical life may decrease as life expectancy decreases (Viscusi and Aldi, 2003). 
However, there are no existing estimates neither about the value of a statistical life of our relevant 
population group, or about to what extent the value for a healthy individual should be reduced to obtain the 
value for a disabled individual, or the difference in life-expectancy between our population group and the 
average population in order to use a life expectancy-adjusted value of statistical life. Hence, we have not 
adjusted the value of a statistical life in our simple calculation.  
25
 Results not shown but available from the authors. 
26
 The estimation results can also be found in Appendix Table B2. Note that the number of observations 
decreases over time due to the fact that hospitalizations for deceased are censored. 
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Table 4 presents the results from the IV regressions in which the reduced-form estimates 
are scaled by the amount of the reduction in disability benefits. The results indicate that 
for every thousand euro reduction in DI benefits, women experience a 4.2 percentage 
points higher probability of being hospitalized. This is a relative increase of about 6.9%. 
Furthermore, every thousand euro reduction in DI benefits leads to about 0.46 additional 
hospitalizations by 2005 (18% increase).  
 
In order to better understand how the reform had an impact on health, we investigate the 
probability that women are hospitalized by type of diagnose from 1996 to 2005.
27
 Figure 
5 presents the IV estimates over time for those types of admission diagnoses where the 
reform had a significant impact over most of the years.
28
 We find that the increased 
probability of hospitalization is mostly due to mental, musculoskeletal, nervous and 
digestive problems. These are typically diseases with a large occupation-related 
component (Krause et al., 2001) and hence they may be the result of re-employment after 
the re-examinations. This possibility will be investigated in more detail in section 5.4. In 
addition, it is noteworthy the large relative increase of the probability of being 
hospitalized by 2005 by a mental health problem (68%) or an illness associated to the 
nervous system (36%) after a €1,000 reduction in the amount of DI.  
 
The fact that the effects on hospitalizations remain in the long run suggests that the 
budgetary savings on DI spending are partly offset by health care spending on 
hospitalizations. We use information on the average costs of hospitalization by type of 
treatment, and calculate that health care spending on hospital care increases by €346 
million (see Appendix section A2 for more information on the calculation). Given that 
total savings were €1,486 million, this implies that for every €1 saving on DI health care 
expenditures on hospitalizations went up by €0.23 cents. This is a very rough estimate 
and a lower bound of the true effect, since we only take into account whether or not an 
individual has been hospitalized in the period 1996-2005 and not the total number of 
                                                 
27
 Unfortunately, we do not have reliable information on the medical condition that led to enrollment in DI. 
28
 The IV estimates for all types of hospitalizations up till 2005 and their mean prevalence are shown in the 
Appendix Table B3. 
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hospitalizations. In addition, other health care costs are excluded from the analysis as we 
do not have information on outpatient visits or pharmaceutical consumption. Hence, our 
findings suggest that the budgetary consequences of the health effects following the DI 
reform are an important and non-negligible side-effect.  
 
5.3 Robustness of the results 
 
Table 5 presents the results of various sensitivity analyses. In Panel A we present the 
results of estimations without any control variables. In Panel B we include a quadratic in 
age in the model. The results remain mostly unchanged when leaving out the controls or 
including a quadratic in age in the model. Panel C shows the outcomes when immigrants 
are included in the sample. The results for women remain unchanged. For men, the 
significant mortality effects disappear. This is consistent with differences in the share of 
immigrants (at least from East Indies) between age groups, and lower life expectancy of 
non-natives compared to natives. In addition, measurement error in the month and year of 
birth would bias our estimates towards zero. Panel D shows the results of estimations 
when we use a different definition of hospitalizations in which only hospitalizations that 
last at least two nights are considered. One could think that the previous results on 
hospitalizations for females were driven by women going more often to the hospital 
trying to get diagnosed to go back into DI. However, the effects on the probability of 
hospitalization by 2005 are similar when we use a more stringent definition of 
hospitalizations, and therefore the Dutch DI reform has had true health effects for 
women.   
 
As mentioned in section 4, we choose a slightly larger bandwidth than would be optimal 
based on the Imbens-Kalyanaraman criterium given the lack of power for the smaller 
bandwidth. One may be concerned that the health effects are therefore driven by the 
inclusion of individuals further away from the threshold so they are the result of age 
differences. For our results for women we argue that it is unlikely to be the case as treated 
individuals are younger and this would imply lower mortality and hospitalizations for the 
treated group. However, for men we cannot rule out that this is the case. However, in 
Figures 6 and 7 we investigate how sensitive our results are to the chosen bandwidth size. 
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The figures illustrate that the point estimates of our models are quite robust to bandwidth 
size.
29
 More specifically, the results remain stable after the optimal bandwidth of 24 
months according to the Imbens-Kalyamaran procedure. The standard errors of the 
estimates, however, are sensitive to the bandwidth, and the figures show that as the power 
increases (larger bandwidth includes larger number of observations), the estimates also 
become more precise. 
 
5.4 Are the effects driven by changes in employment or total income?   
 
Our results show that changes in the DI generosity have important health effects on DI 
recipients. The negative health effects among women are likely to be driven by increased 
stress related to new employment situation or reduced income, and/or occupational 
diseases if the person enters into paid employment. The reduced generosity of this reform 
has been found to have effects both on employment and total income. Borghans et al. 
(2014) have shown that participation in employment went up by 2.9 percentage points 
after the reform. Also total income changed, albeit to a lesser extent: on average, for 
every euro lost on DI benefits, about 92 cents is compensated through increased labor 
earnings or other benefit income. We exploit our information on employment status and 
total income to disentangle the importance of both in explaining the total health effects.  
 
We re-estimate our IV models using two additional scaling variables: a dummy for 
whether the individual is in paid employment and individual total income in 1999 (i.e. 
after the re-examinations were finished). Table 6 Panel A shows that conclusions are 
similar if we use employment status as the scaling variable and the treatment dummy as 
the instrument. There are health costs (gains) for those women (men) that get into paid 
employment due to the stricter eligibility criteria. On the other hand, income changes 
driven by the reform do not seem to explain changes in mortality or hospitalizations 
(Panel B). For women, the reform did not have an effect on total income (no first stage 
effect). This is in line with the finding by Borghans and co-authors (2014) that 
individuals are able to (nearly) fully compensate a drop in DI benefits via higher labor 
                                                 
29
 Only for very small bandwidths they are quite different, but one should be careful interpreting these point 
estimates since also the standard errors are very large.    
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market earnings and/or other social security benefits. For men, the reform had an effect 
on total income, but a €1,000 reduction in total income is not associated with a 
statistically significant mortality effect. Therefore, the previous health effects for men 
and women must be driven by individuals who left DI and moved into employment due 
to the more stringent DI criteria, and not by those who stayed on DI with reduced 
benefits.   
 
5.5 Why did the reform only harm the health of women?   
 
Our results have shown clear gender differences in the health effects of the Dutch DI 
reform. It may be that the reform affected men and women in a different way. One of the 
implications of the new criteria is that disabilities related to mental health problems 
became more difficult to prove than physical health problems (see section 2). Women are 
more likely to suffer from mental problems (37% of females vs. 28% of males), while 
men are more likely to suffer from physical health, like musculoskeletal (31% of males 
and 26% of females) and cardiovascular (8% of males vs. 3% of females) problems 
(UWV, 2006).
30
 Then, one would expect the average man who left DI to be healthier than 
the average woman who left DI, as it is more likely that the reclassification was driven by 
a health recovery among men. This could explain the gender differences as employment 
may be more hazardous when initial health is poorer. Similarly, one might also expect 
heterogeneous effects by type of health condition. Unfortunately, information about type 
of illness is missing in our data so we cannot test for this. 
 
In order to ascertain what can explain the gender differences, we pool observations for 
men and women, and make a distinction by three other variables that may drive these 
results: degree of disability (full/partial), disability duration and earnings level. The 
results are shown in Table 7.  
 
First, women are more likely to be fully disabled compared to men (see Table 2). One 
would expect that fully disabled would suffer more from a DI reform that decreases the 
                                                 
30
 Numbers are averages calculated for period after the reform (1994-2005). 
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amount of benefits and encourages disabled individuals to go back to work than partially 
disabled, as the labor market opportunities for the former are expected to be worse. The 
DI reform raises the probability of mortality by 2010 for both fully and partial disabled 
women, while it decreases the probability of mortality by 2010 only for fully disabled 
men (Panel A of Table 7). In addition, the increase in both the probability and the number 
of hospitalizations by 2005 only appear for fully disabled women. In addition, the 
estimated effect is statistically different for males and females in the two subgroups 
(partial and fully disabled). This suggests that the gender-specific findings cannot (only) 
be attributed to differences in the level of disability between genders.  
 
Second, we investigate the time spent on DI at the time the reform came into effect. On 
the one hand, individuals who have been on DI for longer may suffer more from forced 
labor market re-entry as they have been detached from the labor market for longer. On 
the other hand, the health of long-term disabled may have improved while on DI, 
therefore they may well be able to find re-employment without this having adverse health 
effects. From Table 2 we know that women have slightly shorter DI spells than men. 
Panel B of Table 7 shows separate results by time spent in DI. We find that the mortality 
effects for men are concentrated among long-term disabled, whereas there are negative 
effects for women who are either long-term or short-term disabled. Moreover, the 
difference in the direction of the effect between males and females remains among the 
long-term disabled. This suggests that gender-specific findings can neither (only) be 
driven by differences in the time spent on DI between genders.  
 
There are large differences in the labor market history and opportunities between men 
and women, as women tend to be low wage earners. Therefore, our results could be well 
driven by lower wage earners (mainly women) having to return to more health hazardous 
jobs compared to higher earners (mainly men). In Panel C of Table 7 we separately 
estimate the effect of the reform for those below and above the median level
31
 of labor 
market earnings (measured before entry in DI). We find that the negative health effects 
are indeed concentrated among low earning women, whereas the positive health effects 
                                                 
31
 Note that we use the overall median wage, not gender specific. When using gender specific medians, we 
could not separate the gender effects from the earnings effect. 
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for men are concentrated among high earning men. Figure 8 shows the reduced form 
effects on mortality over time for the four different groups (low earnings females, high 
earnings females, low earnings males, and high earnings males). We find that the positive 
health effects on high earning males affected by the reform are apparent in the short-run 
(from 1998). Moreover, the estimated effect on high earning females is similar in both 
size and sign, and not statistically different, to the estimated effect on high earning males, 
although it is never statistically significant. The lack of statistical significance can be due 
to the low number of females that are among the high earners, as only 24% of females 
have pre-DI earnings above the median. The differences between high earning males and 
low earning females are clear since the early 2000s. This finding suggests that part of the 
gender differences is driven by differences in the skill level between males and females in 
our sample. However, this cannot be the only explanation as the reform did not have any 
effect on low earning males. In addition, these results pose some equity concerns on the 
effects of the DI reform, as the health gains are concentrated among the high-earners 
while the losses are concentrated among the low-earners.  
 
Furthermore, gender differences in occupations may be responsible for these differential 
health effects. LaMontagne et al. (2008) have shown that job strain related to depression 
is mostly concentrated in low skilled occupations, and national statistics show that female 
recipients in the relevant age group are about 10 percentage points more likely to suffer 
from mental health problems compared to males (UWV, 2006). Hence, this suggests that 
the combination of the type of health problems and the occupational position makes 
women more vulnerable to the reform. Unfortunately, type of illness is not registered in 
our data and we cannot test this hypothesis directly.  
 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we investigate whether disability insurance reform aiming to contain moral 
hazard may have additional welfare effects via changes in people’s health. The standard 
assessment of welfare effects of DI balances the gains from insuring incomes against the 
losses from moral hazard. Welfare improving reforms aim to encourage the work-able to 
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become re-employed. However, when this is pushed too far and even less work-able are 
forced back to work this may come at a long term cost to their health. Such adverse 
health effects are not only undesirable from a human perspective, but also entail 
additional health care expenses which offset the savings from reduced expenditure on DI. 
Little is known about health effects of DI reforms and a better understanding of these 
effects is crucial for designing effective public policy. 
 
We exploit a cohort discontinuity in the stringency of the 1993 Dutch disability reforms 
to obtain causal estimates of the effects of decreased generosity of disability insurance 
(DI) on health outcomes of existing DI recipients. We find that the reform in Dutch DI 
has had important health effects which last for more than 15 years after the reform. 
Women aged 44 and younger which are subjected to the stricter re-examinations 
experience more hospitalizations over time. Furthermore, their mortality is 1.4 percentage 
points higher by 2010 than for the cohort aged at least 45. For men, on the other hand, 
mortality rates were reduced by 1.2 percentage points. Therefore, there were clear gender 
differences in the effect of the reform. A plausible explanation is that the reform affected 
men and women in a different way, as mental health problems, which were more 
prevalent among women, became more difficult to prove than physical health problems. 
This would imply that women leaving DI were on average in worse health than men, and 
therefore more sensitive to the occupational risks. Our data do not allow us to test for 
this.  
 
We investigate if other factors, which are correlated with gender, may be responsible for 
the gender differences. Our results show that the gender-specific findings cannot (only) 
be attributed to differences in the level of disability neither to differences in the time in 
DI between genders. However, earnings differences play an important role. We find that 
the health gains are concentrated among high earning males, while the health costs are 
paid by low earning females. Job strain related to depression seems to be concentrated in 
low skilled occupations (LaMontagne, 2008). This suggests that the combination of the 
type of health problems and the occupational position makes women more vulnerable to 
the reform.    
 
22 
 
Regardless of the specific driving mechanisms behind these gender differences, our 
results illustrate that there were clear winners and losers from this reform. We believe 
this is a relevant lesson applicable to other institutional settings and DI reforms. On the 
one hand, tightening of the eligibility criteria to reduce moral hazard can not only 
increase labor force participation but also improve population health if targeted to the 
appropriate groups. On the other hand, if the criteria do not allow benefits entitlement to 
individuals in some vulnerable groups, the incentives to go back to work may have 
irreversible damages to their health. In order to advance in the identification of the groups 
that can benefit from a DI reform and the groups that society needs to protect, future 
research should focus on better identification of the effects of DI policies on individuals 
with different health conditions and in different occupational groups.          
 
A simple back-of-the-envelope calculation shows that every €1 reduction on DI benefits 
was offset by €0.23 additional health care expenses on hospitalizations. Furthermore, the 
welfare loss of deteriorated health through increased mortality resulting from every €1 
reduction on DI was valued as €0.69. Borghans et al (2014) evaluate the effects of this 
reform on social support substitution, and find that for every €1 reduction on DI, 
individuals collect 31 cents more from other social security programs. These results 
should change the moral hazard debate. They show that the discussion should not only 
focus on the tradeoff between providing disability insurance and making people go back 
to work, but that there are other important behavioral effects that may not only 
compensate the savings from reduction in the DI generosity, but entail additional costs in 
other government budgets and the society as a whole.  
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1: Effect of DI Reform on mortality by 2010  
A. Males 
 
B. Females 
 
Note: Dashed lines represent the 95% confidence intervals. Regression estimates come from RD reduced-
form regressions with the following controls: a dummy for being subject to the strict re-examinations 
(treatment), its interaction with [age-45], and age in months as of 8/1/93.   
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Figure 2: Reduced-form effects of DI Reform on mortality 1996-2010 
 
 
 Note: Unfilled markers refer to coefficients not significantly different from zero at a 10% level. 
Black markers are significant at a 5% level, and grey markers are significant at the 10% level. Each 
dot in the figure comes from a separate regression. The following controls are used in the regressions: 
a dummy for being subject to the strict re-examinations (treatment), its interaction with [age-45], age 
in months as of 8/1/93, 6 dummies for degree of disability in 1996, pre-DI earnings, a dummy for 
being married in 1996, a dummy for being conceived during and born shortly after WWII (May 1945 
– February 1946), a dummy for being conceived and born after WWII (February 1946 – January 
1947), 39 regional dummies, 11 month of birth dummies, and duration in DI at the start of the reform.  
-0.015 
-0.01 
-0.005 
0 
0.005 
0.01 
0.015 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Males Females 
28 
 
 
Figure 3: Effect of DI reform on probability of being hospitalized by 2005 
A. Males  
B. Females 
Note: Dashed lines represent the 95% confidence intervals. Regression estimates come from RD reduced-
form regressions with the following controls: a dummy for being subject to the strict re-examinations 
(treatment), its interaction with [age-45], and age in months as of 8/1/93.  
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Figure 4: Reduced-form effects of DI reform on hospitalizations 1996-2005  
 
A. Probability of being hospitalized 
 
 
B. Cumulative number of hospitalizations 
 
  
Note: Unfilled markers refer to coefficients not significantly different from zero at a 10% 
level. Black markers are significant at a 5% level, and grey markers are significant at the 10% 
level. Each dot in the figure comes from a separate regression. See the note to Figure 2 for 
the demographic controls included in the regressions.   
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Figure 5: IV results for probability of being hospitalized by cause - Females 
  
Panel A. Mental  
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Note: Unfilled markers refer to coefficients not significantly different from zero at a 10% level. 
Black markers are significant at a 5% level, and grey markers are significant at the 10% level. 
Each dot in the figure comes from a separate regression. In the IV regressions the variable that is 
instrumented is the amount of DI, so the coefficients can be interpreted as effect size per 
€1,000/year decrease in DI. The instrument itself is the treatment dummy (aged under 45 as of 
8/1/93). The following controls are used in the regressions: a dummy for being subject to the strict 
re-examinations (treatment), its interaction with [age-45], age in months as of 8/1/93, 6 dummies 
for degree of disability in 1996, pre-DI earnings, a dummy for being married in 1996, a dummy for 
being conceived during and born shortly after WWII (May 1945 – February 1946), a dummy for 
being conceived and born after WWII (February 1946 – January 1947), 39 regional dummies, 11 
month of birth dummies, and duration in DI at the start of the reform. 
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Figure 6: Sensitivity to choice of bandwidth of the reduced-form estimates of the effect of 
the DI reform on mortality by 2010.  
A. Males  
 
 
B. Females  
 
Note: Estimates come from set of RD reduced-form regressions in which the bandwidth is increased 
gradually by one-month from 1 to 60 months. The following controls are used in the regressions: a dummy 
for being subject to the strict re-examinations (treatment), its interaction with [age-45], age in months as of 
8/1/93, 6 dummies for degree of disability in 1996, pre-DI earnings, a dummy for being married in 1996, a 
dummy for being conceived during and born shortly after WWII (May 1945 – February 1946), a dummy 
for being conceived and born after WWII (February 1946 – January 1947), 39 regional dummies, and 
duration in DI at the start of the reform. 
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Figure 7: Sensitivity to choice of bandwidth of the reduced-form estimates of the effect of 
the DI reform the probability of being hospitalized by 2005.  
A. Males  
 
 
B. Females  
 
Note: Estimates come from set of RD reduced-form regressions in which the bandwidth is increased 
gradually by one-month from 1 to 60 months. See the note to Figure 6 for the demographic controls 
included in the regression.  
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Figure 8:  Reduced-form effects of DI Reform on mortality 1996-2010, by previous earnings 
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Note: Unfilled markers refer to coefficients not significantly different from zero at a 10% level. 
Black markers are significant at a 5% level, and grey markers are significant at the 10% level. 
Estimates for each year come from a separate regression. The following controls are used in the 
regressions: a dummy for being subject to the strict re-examinations (treatment), its interaction 
with each of the four subgroups,  its interaction with [age-45], age in months as of 8/1/93, a 
different age trend for each of the four subgroups, 6 dummies for degree of disability in 1996, 
pre-DI earnings, a dummy for being married in 1996, a dummy for being conceived during and 
born shortly after WWII (May 1945 – February 1946), a dummy for being conceived and born 
after WWII (February 1946 – January 1947), gender, 39 regional dummies, 11 month of birth 
dummies, and duration in DI at the start of the reform. 
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Table 1: Relation between Degree of Disability and Replacement Rates 
Degree of disability: Replacement rate (% of last earned wage): 
80 – 100 % 70 % 
65 – 80 % 50.75 % 
55 – 65 % 42 % 
45 – 55 % 35 % 
35 – 45 % 28 % 
25 – 35 % 21 % 
15 – 25 % 14 % 
Less than 15 % 0 % 
Source: UWV (2006). UWV is the abbreviation of the agency that administers all social insurance for 
employees in the Netherlands. See text for a description of how the degree of disability is determined. 
Disability insurance benefit levels are determined as a percentage of the last earned wage and adjusted for 
inflation over time. 
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Table 2:  Descriptive Statistics  
 Males Females 
 
All 40.0-
44.9 
45.0-
49.9 
All 40.0-
44.9 
45.0-
49.9 
Panel A: Sample characteristics, measured prior to re-examination 
Age on August 1
st
, 1993 45.49 42.64 47.51 45.47 42.59 47.52 
Duration in DI on August 1
st
, 1993 (months) 101.37 94.95 103.36 90.28 91.14 89.68 
Degree of disability (% of earnings capacity lost): 
  15-25 7.4 13.5 6.3 4.8 5.5 4.4 
  25-35 11.5 14.4 10.1 5.0 5.7 4.5 
  35-45 9.0 8.4 8.1 3.5 3.9 3.2 
  45-55 7.1 5.1 6.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 
  55-65 2.4 2.1 2.5 1.6 1.7 1.5 
  65-80 2.5 2.2 2.5 1.2 1.2 1.2 
  80-100 60.1 54.3 63.6 79.0 77.1 80.4 
       
Panel B: Health outcomes after re-examination 
Hospitalizations by 2005:       
Probability of being hospitalized 1996-2005 
(%) 
Cumulative number of hospitalizations to 2005 
N 
55.0 
 
2.04 
82921 
52.6 
 
1.88 
34824 
55.9 
 
2.10 
48097 
60.7 
 
2.56 
43687 
60.0 
 
2.59 
18241 
61.3 
 
2.55 
25446 
 
 
  
   
Mortality (%):       
  By 2010 15.6 12.5 17.6 11.2 10.3 11.8 
N 91090 37547 53543 46669 19385 27284 
       
Note: Since we have information available from 1996 onwards, the degree of disability is recorded in 
January 1996 (before the re-examinations). 
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Table 3:  IV estimates. Effect of reform per 1000 €/year decrease in amount of original DI. 
Results for mortality 1996-2010 
        Males Females 
 
First Stage -1.302  (0.075)**** -0.535 (0.076)*** 
     
1999 -0.002 (0.002) 0.001 (0.005) 
2000 -0.003 (0.002) <0.001 (0.006) 
2001 -0.004 (0.002) <0.001 (0.007) 
2002 -0.004 (0.003) 0.004 (0.007) 
2003 -0.005 (0.003)* 0.003 (0.008) 
2004 -0.004 (0.003) 0.009 (0.008) 
2005 -0.002 (0.003) 0.008 (0.009) 
2006 -0.003 (0.003) 0.009 (0.010) 
2007 -0.005 (0.003) 0.008 (0.010) 
2008 -0.006 (0.004) 0.012 (0.011) 
2009 -0.008 (0.004)** 0.023 (0.011)** 
2010 -0.009 (0.004)** 0.026 (0.012)** 
   
N 91090 46669 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10 percent; ** 5 percent; *** 1 percent. 
Each entry in the table comes from a separate regression.  In the IV regressions the variable that is 
instrumented is the amount of DI, so the coefficients can be interpreted as effect size per €1000/year 
decrease in DI. The instrument itself is the treatment dummy (age less than 45 as of 8/1/93). The following 
controls are used in the regressions: a dummy for being subject to the strict re-examinations (treatment), its 
interaction with [age-45], age in months as of 8/1/93, 6 dummies for degree of disability in 1996, pre-DI 
earnings, a dummy for being married in 1996, a dummy for being conceived during and born shortly after 
WWII (May 1945 – February 1946), a dummy for being conceived and born after WWII (February 1946 – 
January 1947), 39 regional dummies, 11 month of birth dummies, and duration in DI at the start of the 
reform. 
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Table 4:  IV estimates. Effect of reform per 1000 €/year decrease in amount of original DI. 
Results for probability of being hospitalized in 1996-2005 and number of hospitalizations in 
1996-2005 
 Males Females 
 
Probability of 
being 
hospitalized 
between 1996 
and year 
Cumulative 
number of 
hospitalizations 
N 
Probability of 
being 
hospitalized 
between 1996 
and year 
Cumulative 
number of 
hospitalizations 
N 
           
1999 0.003 (0.005) -0.001 (0.025) 88767 0.025 (0.018) 0.260 (0.105)** 45819 
2000 0.003 (0.005) -0.003 (0.029) 87906 0.032 (0.019)* 0.354 (0.127)*** 45486 
2001 0.002 (0.005) -0.004 (0.034) 87012 0.031 (0.019) 0.416 (0.143)*** 45142 
2002 0.002 (0.005) -0.007 (0.040) 86043 0.033 (0.020)* 0.418 (0.163)** 44787 
2003 0.002 (0.006) -0.022 (0.046) 85034 0.044 (0.020)** 0.453 (0.186)** 44443 
2004 0.001 (0.006) -0.035 (0.053) 83959 0.044 (0.020)** 0.462 (0.213)** 44077 
2005 0.002 (0.006) -0.032 (0.061) 82921 0.042                   (0.020)** 0.463 (0.237)** 43687 
           
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10 percent; ** 5 percent; *** 1 percent. 
Each entry in the table comes from a separate regression.  In the IV regressions the variable that is 
instrumented is the amount of DI, so the coefficients can be interpreted as effect size per €1000/year 
decrease in DI. The instrument itself is the treatment dummy (age less than 45 as of 8/1/93). See the 
note to Table 3 for the demographic controls included in the regression. 
   
 
  
38 
 
Table 5:  Robustness of reduced form results  
       Males     Females 
  
Panel A: No controls   
Mortality by 2010 -0.012 (0.005)** 0.014 (0.006)** 
N 91090 46669 
   
Cum. # of hospitalizations by 2005  -0.037 (0.080) 0.247 (0.121)** 
Prob. of hospitalizations by 2005 0.002 (0.007) 0.022 (0.010)** 
N 82921 43687 
   
   
Panel B: Quadratic age trend   
Mortality by 2010 -0.012 (0.005)** 0.014 (0.006)** 
N 91090 46669 
   
Cum. # of hospitalizations by 2005  -0.053 (0.081) 0.228 (0.123)* 
Prob. of hospitalizations by 2005 0.001 (0.007) 0.027 (0.010)*** 
N 82921 43687 
   
Panel C: Sample with immigrants   
Mortality by 2010 -0.006 (0.005) 0.012 (0.005)** 
N 108271 56872 
   
Cum # of hospitalizations by 2005 -0.015 (0.072) 0.243 (0.103)** 
Prob. of hospitalizations by 2005 0.004 (0.007) 0.019 (0.009)** 
N 98650 53379 
   
Panel D: Hospitalizations with at least 2 nights 
Prob. of hospitalizations by 2005 -0.003 (0.007) 0.022 (0.010)** 
N 82921 43687 
   
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10 percent; ** 5 percent; *** 1 percent. 
Each entry in the table comes from a separate regression. See the note to Table 3 for the demographic 
controls included in the regression. Estimates in Panel C also include 10 national origin dummies.  
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Table 6:  Results for different scaling variables  
                Males      Females 
Panel A: Instrument employment dummy (IV) 
First stage 0.036 (0.005)*** 0.029 (0.005)*** 
  
 
Effect of being re-employed in 1999 
after the  re-examination 
Mortality by 2010 -0.322 (0.143)** 0.426 (0.195)** 
N 91090 58048 
   
Cum. # of hospitalizations by 2005 -1.149 (2.188) 8.487 (3.706)** 
Prob. of hospitalizations by 2005 0.057 (0.200) 0.817 (0.327)** 
N 82921 54491 
   
Panel B: Instrument total income (in €1000) (IV) 
First stage -0.315 (0.155)** 0.134 (0.110) 
   
 
Effect of 1000€/year decrease  
in total income in 1999 
Mortality by 2010 -0.037 (0.025)  
N 91090  
   
Cum. # of hospitalizations by 2005 -0.133 (0.261)  
Prob. of hospitalizations by 2005 0.007 (0.023)  
N 82921  
   
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10 percent; ** 5 percent; *** 1 percent. 
Each entry in the table comes from a separate regression. See the note to Table 3 for the demographic 
controls included in the regression. 
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Table 7:  Different heterogeneous effects. Reduced-form effects of DI Reform  
 Mortality by 2010 
Cum. # of 
hospitalizations by 
2005 
Prob. of being 
hospitalized by 2005 
       
Panel A: By DI-level in January 1996 
βFull, Male -0.017 (0.006)*** -0.141 (0.102) -0.001 (0.009) 
βFull, Female 0.014 (0.007)** 0.297 (0.120)** 0.025 (0.011)** 
βPartial, Male -0.006 (0.007) 0.051 (0.001) 0.006 (0.010) 
βPartial, Female 0.022 (0.012)* 0.196 (0.199) 0.016 (0.017) 
βFull, Male= βFull, Female [<0.001] [0.003] [0.042] 
βPartial, Male= βPartial, Female [0.025] [0.493] [0.581] 
βFull, Male= βPartial, Male [0.210] [0.192] [0.587] 
βFull, Female= βPartial, Female [0.522] [0.634] [0.612] 
       
Panel B: By time in DI at August 1st, 1993 
β>=5yr, Male -0.020 (0.005)*** -0.133 (0.093) -0.001 (0.008) 
β>=5yr, Female 0.022 (0.008)*** 0.291 (0.136)** 0.023 (0.012)* 
β<5yr, Male <0.001 (0.007) 0.061 (0.110) 0.005 (0.010) 
β<5yr, Female 0.008 (0.008) 0.264 (0.141)* 0.025 (0.012)** 
β>=5yr, Male = β>=5yr, Female [<0.001] [0.008] [0.090] 
β<5yr, Male = β<5yr, Female [0.429] [0.242] [0.205] 
β>=5yr, Male = β<5yr, Male [0.006] [0.119] [0.534] 
β>=5yr, Female = β<5yr, Female [0.179] [0.873] [0.876] 
       
Panel C: By earnings before DI 
βLow, Male 0.002 (0.007) -0.183 (0.111) -0.019 (0.010)* 
βLow, Female 0.023 (0.007)*** 0.253 (0.120)** 0.029 (0.011)*** 
βHigh, Male -0.020 (0.005)*** 0.009 (0.093) 0.012 (0.008) 
βHigh, Female -0.007 (0.011) 0.356 (0.183)* 0.008 (0.016) 
βLow, Male = βLow, Female [0.024] [0.006] [<0.001] 
βHigh, Male = βHigh, Female [0.645] [0.086] [0.788] 
βLow, Male = βHigh, Male [0.003] [0.123] [0.004] 
βLow, Female = βHigh, Female [0.004] [0.597] [0.220] 
Note: Reduced form results. Standard errors are in parentheses. P-values in square brackets. Significance 
levels: * 10 percent; ** 5 percent; *** 1 percent. Each set of estimates per outcome and panel in the table 
comes from a separate regression. The following controls are used in the regressions: a dummy for being 
subject to the strict re-examinations (treatment), its interaction with each of the four subgroups, its 
interaction with [age-45], age in months as of 8/1/93, a different age trend for each of the four subgroups, 
6 dummies for degree of disability in 1996, pre-DI earnings, a dummy for being married in 1996, a 
dummy for being conceived during and born shortly after WWII (May 1945 – February 1946), a dummy 
for being conceived and born after WWII (February 1946 – January 1947), gender, 39 regional dummies, 
11 month of birth dummies, and duration in DI at the start of the reform. 
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Appendix A: Back-of-the-envelope calculation of effectiveness of DI reform 
 
A.1. Welfare effect 
 Total Males Females 
Number of individuals 137,759 91,090 46,669 
    
Average savings per individual per year  1,000 1,000 
Savings per year 138M 91M 47M 
Total savings of a €1,000 reduction in DI benefits 
by 2010 (corrected for 2% inflation) 
 
1,486M 
 
983M 
 
503M 
    
Value of a statistical life in 2010 2.6M 2.6M 2.6M 
Estimated mortality effect of a €1,000 reduction in DI 
benefits 
 -0.9 p.p. 2.6 p.p 
Percentage effect of a €1,000 reduction in DI benefits 
(estimated effect/average mortality) 
 -5.769 23.214 
Total deaths by 2010  14,210 5,227 
Additional number of deaths due to a €1000 reduction 
in DI benefits 
 -820 1,213 
Total loss of a €1,000 reduction in DI benefits by 
2010  
1,023M -2,132M 3,155M 
    
Average additional loss per euro saved on DI benefits €0.69   
 
Gains 
If DI benefits were reduced by €1,000 annually for each of the 46,669 women and 91,090 
men in the age group in this study, this implies that annual DI benefits were reduced by 
€138 million per year from 1999 onwards (i.e. the first year for which all re-examinations 
were completed for the relevant age group). Hence, by 2010, using an inflation correction 
of 2% per year and assuming no attrition from DI due to death or other reasons, this 
implies a total saving of €1.49 billion. 
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Losses 
According to Blaaeij (2003), the value of a statistical life in the Netherlands is €2.2 
million in 2001 prices, which amounts to €2.6 million in 2010 prices. For every €1,000 
reduction in DI benefits mortality for men is decreased by 5.8%. Given 91,090 men and 
an average mortality rate of 15.6% this implies 820 less fatalities due to the reform, 
which have a total value of €2,132 million. 
 
For women, on the other hand, for a €1,000 reduction in DI benefits, mortality is 
increased by 23%. Given 46,669 women and an average mortality rate of 11.2% this 
implies 1,213 additional fatalities due to the reform, which have a total value of €3,155 
mln. 
 
Net welfare effect of DI reform 
A simple back-of-the-envelope calculation shows that for every €1 saved on DI benefits 
there is on average an additional welfare loss of €0.69 due to mortality effects.32 
Although this is just a rough estimate, it does point to the fact that a DI reform aimed at 
reducing moral hazard may have substantial negative welfare effects for some 
individuals. Furthermore, the additional costs coming from the increased number of 
hospitalizations for women are not taken into account here. This will be done in section 
A2.  
                                                 
32
 Note that in this calculation we do not aim to provide an overall budgetary effect of the reform. We only 
take into account the direct monetary savings on DI due to the reform, which we compare with the direct 
health effects. There are other indirect monetary savings, e.g. additional income tax revenues on re-
employment labor income, but also other indirect monetary costs, e.g. additional spending on other social 
security benefits, where the latter are likely to outweigh the former (see Borghans et al. (2014) for more 
details). 
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A.2. Budgetary effect 
 
Budgetary gains 
The savings on DI are similar as to those calculated in section A1, i.e. €1.49 billion.  
 
Budgetary losses 
Information on the total costs on hospitalizations in The Netherlands is taken from the 
National institute for Public Health and the Environment (www.kostenvanziekten.nl). 
The costs for the relevant hospitalizations are presented in the second column (A) of the 
Table below. Column 3 (B) presents the effect of the reform on the cumulative 
probability of a particular type of hospitalization for a €1,000 reduction in DI benefits. 
The percentage effect of a €1,000 reduction in DI benefits due to the reform is shown in 
the fourth column (D = B/C), which is then used to calculate the additional health 
spending on hospitalizations by 2005 (E = D*A). 
 
 
Costs  
(M € 2005) 
A 
Effect of 
reform 2005 
B 
Average Prob.  
of hosp. in 
2005  
C 
Effect 
 
D 
Additional 
health costs 
E 
Mental 524.1 0.013 0.028 0.464 243.332 
Musculoskeletal 157.3 0.025 0.204 0.123 19.277 
Nervous 118.6 0.023 0.064 0.359 42.604 
Digestive 211.4 0.023 0.118 0.195 41.205 
Total costs     € 346.418M 
      
Total savings      € 1,486M 
      
Average additional hospitalization costs per euro saved on DI benefits €0.23 
 
Budgetary effect 
Based on the direct monetary savings on DI and the direct additional spending on 
hospitalizations, we can conclude that every euro saved on DI benefits is offset by about 
€0.23 on additional hospitalization expenses. Note that this is an underestimation of the 
actual costs, since we only take into account whether or not someone has been 
44 
 
hospitalized in the period 1996-2005 and not the number of hospitalizations per 
individual.   
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Appendix B: Additional figures and tables  
 
Figure B1: Exit from DI in 1995 
A. Males 
 
 
 
B. Females 
 
Note: Immigrants are not excluded from this Figure as we cannot identify the country of origin for those 
who left DI in 1995. Regression estimates come from RD reduced-form regressions with the following 
controls: a dummy for being subject to the strict re-examinations (treatment), its interaction with [age-45], 
age in months as of 8/1/93.   
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Table B1. Placebo tests. Reduced-form results for the effect of DI reform on different 
characteristics 
Variable     Effect of the reform  Variable Effect of the reform 
Degree of disability   Corop region dummies 
Dummy(15-25%) 0.003 (0.003)  Corop1 -0.002 (0.001) 
Dummy(25-35%) -0.005 (0.003)  Corop2 -0.001 (0.001)** 
Dummy(35-45%) -0.001 (0.003)  Corop3 0.000 (0.002) 
Dummy(45-55%) -0.002 (0.003)  Corop4 0.001 (0.002) 
Dummy(55-65%) 0.002 (0.002)  Corop5 -0.001 (0.001) 
Dummy(65-80%) 0.002 (0.002)  Corop6 0.001 (0.001) 
Dummy(80-100%) 0.001 (0.005)  Corop7 0.000 (0.001) 
    Corop8 0.001 (0.001) 
Previous labor earnings 31.788 (38.017)  Corop9 0.000 (0.001) 
No prev. lab. earn. info. -0.003 (0.003)  Corop10 -0.002 (0.002) 
    Corop11 -0.002 (0.001) 
Dummy(married) 0.002 (0.005)  Corop12 0.001 (0.002) 
    Corop13 -0.003 (0.002) 
Duration in DI 0.594 (0.849)  Corop14 0.001 (0.002) 
    Corop16 -0.001 (0.001) 
    Corop17 0.000 (0.003) 
    Corop18 -0.001 (0.002) 
    Corop19 -0.002 (0.001) 
    Corop20 -0.003 (0.001)** 
    Corop21 -0.001 (0.001) 
    Corop22 -0.002 (0.001) 
    Corop23 -0.003 (0.003) 
    Corop24 -0.002 (0.001) 
    Corop25 0.000 (0.001) 
    Corop26 -0.002 (0.002) 
    Corop27 0.000 (0.001) 
    Corop28 0.000 (0.001) 
    Corop29 -0.003 (0.003) 
    Corop30 0.000 (0.002) 
    Corop31 0.001 (0.001) 
    Corop32 0.001 (0.001) 
    Corop33 0.000 (0.002) 
    Corop34 0.002 (0.002) 
    Corop35 0.002 (0.002) 
    Corop36 0.004 (0.002)* 
    Corop37 0.002 (0.001) 
    Corop38 0.002 (0.001) 
    Corop39 0.008 (0.003)*** 
N 137759   Corop40 0.001 (0.002) 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10 percent; ** 5 percent; *** 1 percent. 
Each entry in the table comes from a separate regression. See the note to Table 3 for the demographic 
controls included in the regression. 
Table B2:  Reduced-form results for the effect of DI reform on mortality 1996-2010, probability of being hospitalized by 1996-2005 and 
number of hospitalizations 1996-2005 
 
Males Females 
 
Mortality N 
Probability of 
being 
hospitalized 
between 1996 
and year 
Cumulative 
number of 
hospitalizations 
N Mortality N 
Probability of being 
hospitalized 
between 1996 and 
year 
Cumulative number 
of hospitalizations 
N 
1996 <0.001 (<0.001) 91090 0.003 (0.004) 0.008 (0.011) 91087 <0.001 (<0.001) 46669 0.021 (0.007)*** 0.055 (0.018)*** 46667 
1997 <0.001 (0.001) 91090 0.005 (0.005) 0.010 (0.018) 90392 -0.001 (0.001) 46669 0.024 (0.008)*** 0.093 (0.029)*** 46412 
1998 -0.003 (0.002)* 91090 0.005 (0.006) 0.002 (0.025) 89619 -0.001 (0.002) 46669 0.023 (0.009)** 0.127 (0.040)*** 46134 
1999 -0.003 (0.002) 91090 0.003 (0.006) -0.002 (0.032) 88767 <0.001 (0.003) 46669 0.013 (0.010) 0.139 (0.052)*** 45819 
2000 -0.004 (0.003) 91090 0.004 (0.007) -0.003 (0.038) 87906 <0.001 (0.003) 46669 0.017 (0.010)* 0.189 (0.062)*** 45486 
2001 -0.005 -0.003) 91090 0.003 (0.007) -0.006 (0.044) 87012 <0.001 (0.004) 46669 0.017 (0.010)* 0.222 (0.069)*** 45142 
2002 -0.005 (0.003) 91090 0.002 (0.007) -0.009 (0.052) 86043 0.002 (0.004) 46669 0.018 (0.010)* 0.224 (0.081)*** 44787 
2003 -0.006 (0.003)* 91090 0.003 (0.007) -0.028 (0.060) 85034 0.001 (0.004) 46669 0.024 (0.010)** 0.242 (0.092)*** 44443 
2004 -0.005 (0.004) 91090 0.001 (0.007) -0.046 (0.070) 83959 0.005 (0.005) 46669 0.023 (0.010)** 0.247 (0.108)** 44077 
2005 -0.003 (0.004) 91090 0.002 (0.007) -0.042 (0.080) 82921 0.004 (0.005) 46669 0.022 (0.010)** 0.247 (0.121)** 43687 
2006 -0.003 (0.004) 91090 
     
0.005 (0.005) 46669 
     
2007 -0.006 (0.004) 91090 
     
0.004 (0.005) 46669 
     
2008 -0.008 (0.005) 91090 
     
0.006 (0.006) 46669 
     
2009 -0.010 (0.005)** 91090 
     
0.012 (0.006)** 46669 
     
2010 -0.012 (0.005)** 91090 
     
0.014 (0.006)** 46669 
     Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10 percent; ** 5 percent; *** 1 percent. Each entry in the table comes from a separate 
regression. See the note to Table 3 for the demographic controls included in the regression. 
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Table B3:  IV results for probability of being hospitalized by cause until 2005 
  Females 
   
 
Mean  
prevalence Effect of reform per 1000 €/year decrease in amount of original DI 
  
Circulatory 0.116  0.012 (0.012) 
Mental 0.028 0.019 (0.007)* 
Musculoskeletal 0.204 0.025 (0.016) 
Neoplasm 0.097 0.012 (0.012) 
Nutritional 0.030 0.003 (0.007) 
Nervous 0.064 0.023 (0.010)** 
Sense 0.074 0.015 (0.010) 
Respiratory 0.051 0.013 (0.009) 
Digestive 0.118 0.023 (0.013)* 
Genitourinary 0.128 0.007 (0.013) 
Symptoms 0.131 0.016 (0.013) 
Injury 0.089 0.020 (0.011)* 
Blood 0.008 0.003 (0.004) 
Dermatological 0.025 0.003 (0.006) 
Congenital 0.005 0.003 (0.003) 
   
N 43687 43687 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10 percent; ** 5 percent; *** 1 percent. Each entry in the table comes from a 
separate regression.  In the IV regressions the variable that is instrumented is the amount of DI, so the coefficients can be interpreted as effect size 
per €1000/year decrease in DI.  The instrument itself is the treatment dummy (age less than 45 as of 8/1/93). See the note to  Table 3 for the 
demographic controls included in the regression. 
 
 
